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Abstract The aim of this paper is to explore several features concerning the
generalizedmarginal rate of substitution (GMRS)when the consumers utilitymaximi-
zation problemwith several constraints is formulated as a quasi-concave programming
problem. We show that a point satisfying the first order sufficient conditions for the
consumer’s problem minimizes the associated quasi-convex reciprocal cost minimi-
zation problems. We define the GMRS between endowments and show how it can be
computed using the reciprocal expenditure multipliers. Additionally, GMRS is proved
to be a rate of change between different proportion bundles of initial endowments.
Finally, conditions are provided to guarantee a decreasing GMRS along a curve of
initial endowments while keeping the consumer’s utility level constant.
Keywords Quasi-concave programming · Indirect utility function · Marginal rates
of substitution · Multiple constraint optimization problems
JEL Classification C61 · D11
1 Introduction
In modern theory, a utility function is a convenient mathematical concept to convey
exactly the same information about consumer’s preferences as it does about the relation
itself. As the ability to rank consumption bundles is all that we require of consumer’s
preference ordering, a utility function representing those preferences is a purely ordi-
nal tool and should, therefore, simply reflect this same ranking on a numerical scale.
So, within this framework, and because that property is not preserved by positive
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monotonic transformations of utility, the idea of diminishing marginal utility of goods
is of no use, thus economists have had to come up with the concept of diminishing
marginal rates of substitution between goods. The equivalence between diminishing
marginal rates of substitution and quasi-concavity of the utility function, rigorously
proved byArrow and Enthoven (1961), transforms quasi-concavity into a fundamental
property of all utility functions.
The problem of the consumer maximizing utility subject to several constraints has
received some attention lately, both from the application and theory points of view.
In the classical single constraint case, the familiar atomistic consumer is endowed
with a fixed monetary income R > 0 and faces the budget constraint px ≤ R, where
p ∈ Rn+ is the vector of market prices of the goods. If one assumes non-satiation of
the preferences and quasi-concavity of the utility function U then the usual first order
conditions are necessary and sufficient for a constraint maximum.
Moreover, if the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint at the opti-
mum x0 is strictly positive, then x0 also minimizes the cost of attaining utility U (x0)
and the marginal cost of utility is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. See
Silberberg (1990); Jehle (1991), among many others, for a complete presentation of
these facts. As pointed out by Arrow and Enthoven (1961), the quasi-concavity of
U and the linearity of the budget constraint make quasi-concave programming the
natural mathematical framework for this analysis.
It is also quite common to add other constraints that have to be explicitly modeled
in many interesting and important problems. The first of such models dates back to
the studies of demand under conditions of rationing during wartime, particularly after
World War II, or other emergencies by Samuelson (1974); Tobin and Houthakker
(1951) and the survey article by Tobin (1952). In Sect. 8 we discuss one example
of coupon rationing constraints to illustrate our results. To study the implications of
the scarcity of time in consumer’s behavior, many authors (see Becker 1965; Baumol
1973; Atkinson and Stern 1979; Steedman 2001, to name just a few) have worked
with models in which two budget constraints are imposed: one incorporating mone-
tary prices; the other incorporating time prices. Suppose that the consumption of one
unit of good k costs pk units of money and tk hours. Since activities cannot be taken






where T is the total endowment of available hours. Diamond and Yaari (1972) model
portfolio choice under uncertainty as a problem of maximizing a two-period utility
function over a period 1 level of consumption with certainty and a state contingent
consumption in period 2. Alternatively, one may suppose that there are several states
of nature. Within each state a consumer may allocate income among the currently
available goods. But when allocation between states is concerned, if assets cannot
be traded freely between states, i.e., there is no opportunity to give up one unit of a
commodity in state 1 in exchange for one unit in state 2 hence the consumer will have
as many separate budget constraints as there are states. Shefrin and Heineke (1979);
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Cornes and Milne (1989) also analyze models with incomplete securities markets in
a multiple constraint setting. The list of applications of models with multiple con-
straints would include the demand of foods subject to the standard budget constraint
as well as to dietary requirements such as a minimum or maximum intake of calories,
Gilley and Karels (1991); the impure public goods model, Cornes and Sandler (1984);
the analysis of own substitution effects, inferior goods or Giffen behavior, (Lancaster
1968; Lipsey and Rosenbluth 1971; Johnson and Larson 1994). Chapter 7 of Cornes
(1992) provides a number of examples and references for applications of the multiple
constraint setting. In Weber (2005) there is an updated list.
The interest of these applications has triggered several papers dealing with some
theoretical aspects of these problems. Initially, the difficulty in obtaining compara-
tive static properties from the direct utility function favored the systematic applica-
tion of dual techniques, Neary and Roberts (1980), or the search for other functional
forms, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). More recently, Partovi and Caputo (2006)
present a new comparative statics formalism for any differentiable, constraint opti-
mization problem. Weber (1998, 2001); Caputo (2001) and Besada and Mirás (2002)
study the relationships between the utility maximization problem and the, so called,
reciprocal expenditure or cost minimization problems by analyzing the equality con-
straint optimization problem formed by those constraints binding at the optimum.They
examine whether an optimal solution of the primal problem is also a solution for all
the reciprocal problems and study the reciprocal relations among the corresponding
multipliers and their interpretation, as in the single constraint case.
If the first constraint, say the budget constraint, is binding at the optimum, the cor-
responding Lagrange multiplier is the marginal utility of income, i.e., the derivative
of the indirect utility function with respect to the first endowment. Again, as utility is
purely ordinal and the sign of the derivatives of the primal multipliers with respect to
the endowments varies with the application of monotone increasing transformations
to the direct utility function, the concept of diminishing marginal utility of income
is meaningless. As in the case of the direct utility, it can be replaced by the concept
of diminishing MRS of income and connected to quasi-concavity of the indirect util-
ity function. In our quasi-concave programming framework we can prove that if all
the constraint functions are convex, a common situation in the economic literature,
then the indirect utility function is also quasi-concave. We then establish that the
quasi-concavity of the indirect utility function implies, if marginal utility of income
is positive, diminishing MRS of income. In fact, it also implies diminishing GMRS
of income or any other initial endowment. We additionally provide two examples to
illustrate that if either quasi-concavity of U or convexity of gi are not guaranteed
then the indirect utility function need not be quasi-concave. These results question the
claim in Weber (2005) that the indirect utility function is “always” quasi-concave.
In any optimization problem the constraints restrict the feasible set. In general if the
number of constraints increases, the “size” of the feasible set decreases. Nevertheless,
a lower optimum value does not necessarily imply lower welfare, as could happen in
a problem with dietary requirements to improve consumer’s health.
Therefore, our aim in this paper is to further explore the multiple constraint opti-
mization results of Besada and Mirás (2002); Caputo (2001); Weber (2001, 1998) and
Besada and Vázquez (1999) in the context of quasi-concave programming problems.
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Our main contribution is to adapt the GMRS, defined by Besada and Vázquez (1999),
to our framework and to interpret it as a rate of change between different proportion
bundles of initial endowments. We also show how the GMRS can be computed using
the reciprocal expenditure multipliers and provide conditions to guarantee a decreas-
ing GMRS along a curve of initial endowments while keeping the consumer’s utility
level constant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general notations and
provides an overview on quasi-concave programming problems. The utilitymaximiza-
tion primal problem and the associated expenditure minimization reciprocal problems
are presented in Sect. 3where, in addition,we establish the relations among the optimal
solutions and the Lagrange multipliers of the primal and the reciprocal problems. The
quasi-concavity of the indirect utility function is studied in Sect. 4. The next section
addresses the definition of the concept of GMRS between endowment proportions of
the primal problem, whereas the interpretation of the reciprocal multipliers as MRS
occupies Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we show that quasi-concavity of the indirect utility func-
tion implies monotonicity of the GMRS. Finally, in Sect. 8 the paper concludes with
an illustrative example to summarize the results.
2 Quasi-concave programming background
We start by introducing some notations and by listing the definitions and results on
quasi-concave functions and quasi-concave programming problems that will be used
in our work. Let us make the following notational convention: if x, y ∈ Rp, x ≥ y
means xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , p, where xi and yi , respectively, represent the i th
element of x and y. We will denote Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0}.
2.1 Quasi-concave functions
Let f : A ⊂ Rn −→ R be a real-valued function defined on a convex set A in Rn .
Function f is said to be quasi-concave on A if for all x, x0 ∈ A and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
f (x) ≥ f (x0) implies f (t x + (1 − t)x0) ≥ f (x0). (1)
A function is quasi-concave if for each real numberα the set Aα = {x ∈ A : f (x) ≥ α}
is convex. The level set Aα is sometimes referred to as the upper-level set. Function
f is said to be quasi-convex on A if − f is quasi-concave on A. It is clear from the
definition that all concave functions are quasi-concave, but the converse is not true.
Thus quasi-concavity is a generalization of the notion of concavity.
2.2 Local and global maxima
Function f is said to be explicitly quasi-concave on A if it is quasi-concave1 and if
for all x, x0 ∈ A, x = x0, and 0 < t ≤ 1,
1 If f is upper-semicontinuous, then property (2) implies the quasi-concavity of f .
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f (x) > f (x0) implies f (t x + (1 − t)x0) > f (x0). (2)
Function f is said to be strictly quasi-concave on A if for all x, x0 ∈ A, x = x0, and
0 < t < 1,
f (x) ≥ f (x0) implies f (t x + (1 − t)x0) > f (x0). (3)
Every explicitly quasi-concave function is quasi-concave and every strictly quasi-
concave function is explicitly quasi-concave. The converse of these statements does
not necessarily hold.
In general, a local maximum of a quasi-concave function is not necessarily a global
maximum. Nevertheless, if f is explicitly quasi-concave, then every local maximum
of f in A is also a global maximum. If f is strictly quasi-concave, then every local
maximum of f in A is also a unique global maximum.
2.3 Quasi-concave programming
Consider a continuously differentiable function f : Rn → R which is quasi-concave
and a vector-function g : Rn → Rm, g = (g1, . . . , gm) such that gi is quasi-convex







is known as a quasi-concave programming problem and was thoroughly discussed by
Arrow and Enthoven (1961). Denote by S the constraint set of this problem and given
λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) ∈ Rm define the lagrangian L(x, λ) = f (x) − λ1g1(x) − · · · −
λm gm(x). Denote by ∇L(x, λ) the gradient vector of L with respect to x evaluated
at (x, λ).
Definition 1 A point x∗ ∈ S satisfies the first order conditions (FOC) if there exists
λ∗ ∈ Rm such that
1. λ∗ ≥ 0
2. ∇L(x∗, λ∗) ≤ 0
3. ∇L(x∗, λ∗) · x∗ = 0
4. λ∗ · g(x∗) = 0
The FOC alone does not necessarily imply that x∗ maximizes f subject to x ∈ S.
The FOC are sufficient conditions for the existence of a maximum if the Kuhn-Tucker
constraint qualification condition is satisfied. Different constraint qualifications have
been proposed in the literature since the seminal work of Arrow and Enthoven (1961)
which are basically improvements, refinements and generalizations of this work. Yet,
these conditions are sometimes used carelessly in the economic literature (Giorgi
1995). We will state the qualification condition obtained in Takayama (1994).
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Proposition 1 If f is quasi-concave, S is convex and condition
∇ f (x∗) = 0, for x∗ ∈ S
holds, then the (FOC) at x∗ imply that x∗ maximizes f subject to x ∈ S.
If the functions f and gi are quasi-convex, for all i , the problem of choosing x ∈ Rn
so as to minimize f (x) subject to g(x) ≤ 0 and x ≥ 0 is known as a quasi-convex pro-
gramming problem. In this problem, a point x∗ ∈ S satisfies the first order conditions
(FOC) if there existsλ∗ ∈ Rm such that λ∗ ≤ 0, ∇L(x∗, λ∗) ≥ 0, ∇L(x∗, λ∗)·x∗ = 0
and λ∗ · g(x∗) = 0. In this case, Proposition 1 says that (FOC) at x∗ imply that x∗
minimizes f subject to x ∈ S.
3 The consumer’s problem and expenditure reciprocal problems
Our starting point is the familiar atomistic consumer whose preferences over the con-
sumption setRn+ can be represented by a C1-utility functionU : Rn → R. Assume also
that the indifference curves define convex sets, or equivalently diminishing marginal
rates of substitution between goods, that is, the utility function U is quasi-concave
on Rn+.
Let g = (g1, . . . , gm) be a vector-valued constraint function such that gi is a
continuously differentiable, quasi-convex function for all i = 1, . . . , m and c =
(c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm a vector of initial endowments. The general multiple constraint







We will refer to problem P(c) as the primal problem and the associated lagrangian
function will be denoted by
L(x, λ) = U (x) − λ1(g1(x) − c1) − · · · − λm(gm(x) − cm).
Denote by Sc the constraint set of the problem P(c) and the optimal solution to prob-
lem P(c) will be denoted by x(c), with Lagrange multipliers given by λ(c). For each
of these solutions there is a corresponding optimal value V (c) = U (x(c)), the highest
level of utility that can be achieved with endowment c ∈ Rm . V is called the indirect
utility function.
In the single budget constraint case, g(x) = px = c > 0, one can define a
companion measure to the indirect utility function to complete the picture of the con-
sumer’s problem: the expenditure function. Basically, one asks what minimum level
of monetary expenditure the consumer must make to achieve a given level of utility
u. Mathematically, the expenditure function can be expressed as e(u) = min{px :
U (x) ≥ u, x ≥ 0}. Naturally, there is a close and well known relationship between
the indirect utility function and the expenditure function (Jehle 1991). Our aim is to
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generalize this concept to the multiple constraint case and study which relations with
the indirect utility function still stand.
Let us introduce the notation b−k to represent the vector obtained from b = (b1, . . . ,
bm) deleting the k-th coordinate. Associated with the primal problem P(c), there are









where k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Adopting the terminology proposed byCaputo (2001), we refer
to this problem as the k-th reciprocal expenditure problem. Note that any solution for
the problem R(u, c−k) will depend on the parameters u and c−k . Let us write the
Lagrangian function corresponding to R(u, c−k) as
Lk(x, λk) = gk(x) − μk(−U (x) + u) −
∑
j =k
λkj (g j (x) − c j ),
where both the objective function gk(x) and constraints functions, −U (x) and g j (x)
j = k, are quasi-convex functions, so that the problem R(u, c−k) is a quasi-convex
programming problem, and where λk = (μk, λkj ) ∈ Rm, j = k. The optimal solution
of the k-th reciprocal problem R(u, c−k) will be denoted by xk(u, c−k). We define the
k-th expenditure function ek as the minimum value function corresponding to problem
R(u, c−k), that is, ek(u, c−k) = gk(xk(u, c−k)).
Next, we will pursue the relationship between utility maximization and expendi-
ture minimization by choosing the utility level in the reciprocal problems equal to
u = V (c), the optimal level of utility the consumer achieves at c. Without loss of
generality, we will state our results for the first reciprocal problem. Again, to simplify
notation, we will write R(c) instead of R(V (c), c−1) and S1c = {x ∈ Rn : G(x) ≤ B},
where G(x)= (−U (x), g2(x), . . . , gm(x)) and B = (−V (c), c2, . . . , cm), to denote
the constraint set of R(c). Analogously, the multipliers for the reciprocal problem
R(c) will be denoted by λ1(c) = (μ1(c), λ12(c), . . . , λ1m(c)). Note that λ11 does not
exist.
Observe that all the reciprocal problems are quasi-convex programming problems.
From a practical perspective, these reciprocal problemswould be of some interest if the
solution to the utility maximization problem were also a solution to all the reciprocal
expenditure minimization problems. Caputo (2001) and Besada andMirás (2002) pro-
vided results in this line that we extend to the general framework of problems P(c)
and R(u, c−k).
Since the primal problem is a quasi-concave programming problem, the constraint
qualification condition is:
x satisfies the (FOC) for the problem P(c) and ∇U (x) = 0. (4)
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The 1-reciprocal problem is a quasi-convex programming problem, the constraint
qualification condition is:
x satisfies the (FOC) for the problem R(c) and ∇g1(x) = 0. (5)
We can now formulate and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 If x(c) ∈ Sc satisfies (4) with λ1(c) > 0 then x(c) also satisfies the
(FOC) for the 1-reciprocal problem R(u, c−1) where the utility level in the reciprocal
problem is taken to be u = V (c), the optimal level of utility the consumer achieves
at c.
Proof Since x(c) ∈ Sc satisfies the (FOC) for problem P(c), there exists λ(c) ∈ Rm
such that
1. λ(c) ≥ 0
2. ∇L(x(c), λ(c)) ≤ 0
3. ∇L(x(c), λ(c)) · x(c) = 0
4. λ(c) · (g(x(c)) − c) = 0
First, because condition (4) holds, according to Proposition 1, x(c) maximizes U
subject to x ∈ Sc. Consequently, V (c) = U (x(c)) and x(c) ∈ S1c .


















∇g j (x(c)) ≥ 0. (6)
If we define
μ1(c) = − 1
λ1(c)
(7)
λ1j (c) = −
λ j (c)
λ1(c)
, j = 2, . . . , m (8)
it is clear that λ1(c) ≤ 0.
2’. The expression (6) reads ∇L1(x(c), λ1(c)) ≥ 0.
3’. Using the same arguments as we did before, it is easy to see that
∂L
∂xi
(x(c), λ(c)) = 0 if and only if ∂L
1
∂xi
(x(c), λ1(c)) = 0.
Thus, ∇L1(x(c), λ1(c)) · x(c) = 0.
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4’. Obviously, λ1j (c) = 0 if and only if λ j (c) = 0. Moreover, μ1(c) < 0 and
U (x(c)) = V (c). Therefore, λ1(c) · (G(x(c)) − B) = 0.
So,wehave just proved that x(c) satisfies the (FOC) for the quasi-convex programming
problem R(c). 
unionsq
If both conditions (4) and (5) hold,2 a point x(c) satisfying the (FOC) will be a
maximum of U subject to x ∈ Sc and also a minimum of g1 subject to x ∈ S1c . If, in
addition, U is strictly quasi-concave, x(c) is the unique global maximum of U subject
to x ∈ Sc. Moreover, since λ1(c) > 0, necessarily g1(x(c)) = c1, which in turn
implies that
e1(c) = e1(V (c), c−1) = c1. (9)
In words, the expenditure in resource 1 necessary to achieve the maximum utility
V (c) must be an amount equal to the initial endowment c1.
Let U and gi , i = 1, . . . , m be twice continuously differentiable and (x∗, c∗) ∈
R
n × Rm such that x∗ is a solution for the problem P(c∗). Fixed k ∈ {1, . . . , m},
the expenditure function ek viewed only as a function of u is a real function of one




(V (c), c−k) = ∂L
k
∂u
(x(c), c−k) = −μk > 0,
so that ek is strictly increasing in u. Then it has an inverse (ek)−1. Now, from (9) we
have ek(V (c), c−k) = ck . If we apply the inverse function (ek)−1 to both sides of this
identity we conclude the following result.
Proposition 2 Fixed k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and take c ∈ B(c∗, r). Then V (c) = (ek)−1(ck).
This result emphasizes the close connection between utility maximization and
expenditure minimization even in the multiple constraint case. Intuitively, the indirect
utility function is simply the inverse of the expenditure function.
Equality (7), along with equality (8) first stated byWeber (1998) in a simplified set-
ting, extends to themultiple constraint case thewell-known result concerning the recip-
rocal relationship between the Lagrange multipliers of the classical single-constraint
utility maximization and expenditure minimization problems: the marginal utility of
income is the reciprocal of the marginal cost of utility. The exact meaning of (8) will
be the object of the next sections.
2 If one assumes non-satiation of the preferences, that is, ∂U
∂x j
> 0 for some j , then (4) will be satisfied.
If, as usual, g1(x) = px is the budget constraint, then ∇g1(x) = p > 0 will be the price vector of the n
goods and (5) will also be satisfied.
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4 Quasi-concavity of the indirect utility function
We assume that x(c) is the optimal solution of problem P(c) for all c in a certain
convex region D ⊂ Rm and that x(c) and λ(c), which satisfied the (FOC), are con-
tinuously differentiable for all c ∈ D. Then, V (c) = U (x(c)), the indirect utility
function is continuously differentiable on D as well.
It is known, (Sydsaeter 1981; Silberberg 1990) for example, that ifU is concave and
g1, . . . , gm are all convex, then V is concave on D. But concavity is not preserved by
positive monotonic transformations of the utility function so, in our setting this result
is of little help. Weber (2005) claims that V is always quasi-concave, even if U is not
quasi-concave and imposing no restriction to the constraint function g. The following
example shows that in general and even if the constraints are neat linear functions, if
U is not quasi-concave the indirect utility function V itself does not necessarily have
to be quasi-concave.
Example 1 Let U (x, y, z) = xy + z be the utility function, c∗ = (1, 1) the vec-
tor of initial endowments and consider the linear constraints g1(x, y, z) = x + y +
z, g2(x, y, z) = 12 x + y + 4z. Note that U is not quasi-concave on R3+.
















unique global maximum of problem P(c∗), so, both constraints are binding at the
optimum. After some computations we obtain that
x(c1, c2) = 1
14
(8c1 − 2c2 + 1)
y(c1, c2) = 1
12
(8c1 − 2c2 − 1)
z(c1, c2) = 1
84
(−20c1 + 26c2 + 1)
are the components of the demand function near c∗ and














is the indirect utility function in an open neighborhood of (1, 1). Function V is not
quasi-concave near (1, 1). In fact, V is convex in R2.
The above example shows that, in spite of Weber (2005) claim, we can not expect
V to be quasi-concave in general. Nevertheless, in many practical applications of non-
linear programming theory to economics, either the constraints are all linear or they
are all convex. In such a neat situation we can prove the quasi-concavity of the indirect
utility function.
Theorem 2 If U is quasi-concave and all the constraint functions g1, . . . , gm are
either linear or convex, then the indirect utility function V is quasi-concave on D.
Proof Let c, c0 ∈ D such thatV (c) ≥ V (c0).Wehave to prove thatV (tc+(1−t)c0) ≥
V (c0) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Remember that x(c) and x(c0) are the optimal solutions for
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problems P(c) and P(c0) respectively, so g(x(c)) ≤ c and g(x(c0)) ≤ c0. Denote by
ct = tc+(1− t)c0 and xt = t x(c)+(1− t)x(c0). We know thatU (x(c)) ≥ U (x(c0)).
Since U is quasi-concave, we have that
U (xt ) ≥ U (x(c0)). (10)
If all g1, . . . , gm are convex, we can write, g(xt ) ≤ tg(x(c)) + (1 − t)g(x(c0)) ≤
tc+(1−t)c0 = ct , in particular, if all g1, . . . , gm are linear g(xt ) = ct . Thus, xt ∈ Sct ,
that is, xt is in the constraint set for problem P(ct ) and, consequently, V (ct ) ≥ U (xt ).
Combining the last inequality with (10) we have
V (ct ) ≥ U (xt ) ≥ U (x(c0)) = V (c0).
and this concludes the proof. 
unionsq
We would like to point out that, though in our formulation we have imposed dif-
ferentiability on u and g, Theorem 2 is quite general in the sense that no regularity
requirements are needed to prove the quasi-concavity of V beyond the existence of
V itself. To end this section, we provide an example that shows that convexity of the
constraint functions cannot be dropped in Theorem 2. Here, the utility function U and
restriction g1 are both linear but g2 is a quasi-convex function that is not convex.
Example 2 LetU (x, y, z) = x +2y+3z, g1(x, y, z) = x + y+z, g2(x, y, z) = 1xy+1
and c = (c1, c2). Utility function U and restriction g1 are both linear. Restriction g2
is not convex on R3+ because Hg2(x, y, z) is indefinite for all (x, y, z) ∈ R3+ such
that xy ≤ 13 . But since g2 is the reciprocal of a positive quasi-concave function, g2 is
quasi-convex on R3+.
One can check that the point with coordinates


























. Since the constraint qualification condition holds, according to Proposi-
tion 1, this bundle is the maximum of problem P(c). Therefore






412 SERIEs (2011) 2:401–421









. To see this, just observe that, unless empty, the intersection










The previous example shows that Theorem 2 is the best you can get, in the sense
that if just one of the constraints is not convex, then V is not necessarily quasi-concave.
5 Marginal rates of substitution between initial endowments
There are, of course, certain conditions that must be satisfied for the indirect utility
function V to be continuously differentiable. Let us impose some assumptions on
problem P(c).
(A1) U ∈ C2(Rn) and G : Rn × Rm −→ Rm, G(x, c) = g(x) − c, belongs to
C2(Rn × Rm).
(A2) There exists (x∗, c∗) ∈ Rn × Rm such that x∗ satisfies the (FOC) for problem
P(c∗).





i∈I, j=1,...,n has maximal rank.
3
(A4) The Lagrange multipliers associated to the binding constraints at x∗ are strictly
positive, that is, λ∗i > 0 for all i ∈ I .












In particular, the bordered Hessian matrix has nonzero determinant.
Then, by (A1) and (A5) and implicit function theorem, x(c), λ(c), and hence V (c),
become C1-functions in a neighborhood of c∗ that can be chosen sufficiently small so
that the same gi constraints are active “all the time”. Thus, without losing generality,
the consumer’s non-linear programming problem with inequality constraints could be
reduced to a problem with equality constraints, those binding at the optimum. For
simplicity, assume that the active constraints are g1, . . . , gp, p < n. Keeping all these
3 The constraint gi (x) ≤ ci is called active or binding at x∗ provided gi (x∗) = c∗i .
4 IfU is assumed to be explicitly quasi-concave or strictly quasi-concave, then x∗ will be a globalmaximum
or the unique global maximum respectively.
5 These conditions may be stated in terms of the signs of the principal minors of the bordered Hessian
matrix, Takayama (1994).
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considerations in mind, consider the problem of maximizing function U subject to
the p-vector constraints g(x) = c, where c = (c1, . . . , cp) ∈ Rp is the vector of
parameters:
Maximize U (x)
subject to: g(x) = c (E P(c))
Then, for all c ∈ B(c∗, r), x(c) is a strict local maximum of the equality constraints
problem E P(c) with strictly positive Lagrange multipliers given by λ(c).
Proposition 3 Let U and G satisfy (A1) and (A4) and be the bordered Hessian with
nonzero determinant at (x∗, λ∗), the optimal solution for the problem E P(c). Then V
is strictly increasing in each variable c j ; in fact,
∂V
∂c j
(c) = λ j (c) for all j = 1, . . . , p.





(x(c), λ(c)) = λ j (c), j = 1, . . . , p (11)
Now, V is strictly increasing in c j because of (A4). 
unionsq
The Lagrange multiplier λ j (c) is the marginal utility of endowment c j , it measures
the rate at which utility changes as resource c j is increased.
If all we required of the preference ordering is that rankings among bundles be
meaningful, then any utility function representing that ordering is only capable of
carrying ordinal information. No significance can be attached to the actual numbers
assigned by a given utility function to particular bundles, only to the relative sizes of
those numbers. In this respect, let us examine the effect of a positive monotonic trans-
formation of the utility function to the indirect utility function V and the Lagrange
multipliers λ(c). Let h : R −→ R be a differentiable function such that h′(x) > 0 for
all x ∈ R and denote W = h ◦ U the new utility function representing the same pref-
erence ordering as U . First of all, one can easily argue that x(c) is an optimal solution
to problem E P(c) when taking W instead of U as the objective function. Thus, the
relation between the indirect utility functions V and VW for U and W , respectively, is
given by VW = h ◦ V . By the chain rule,
∂VW
∂c j
(c) = h′(V (c)) ∂V
∂c j
(c), j = 1, . . . , p (12)
The above equation illustrates a well-known fact: the Lagrange multipliers are not
preserved by positive monotonic transformations of the utility function but the signs
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So, any given ratio ρkj (c) = λ j (c)λk (c) , j = k, is invariant to positive monotonic transfor-
mations of the utility function even though the Lagrange multipliers λ j (c) themselves
are not.
Theorem 3 Let U and G satisfy (A1) and (A4) and be the bordered Hessian with
nonzero determinant at (x∗, λ∗), the optimal solution for the problem E P(c). Let
h : R −→ R be a differentiable function such that h′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and denote
W = h ◦ U. Then, for all c ∈ B(c∗, r), ρkj (c), j = k, is invariant for U and W .
At this point let usmake a highly informal reasoning. Recall thatρkj = λ jλk , λ j = ∂V∂c j








. Hence, it seems that the multiplier ratios can be seen as marginal
rates of substitution among the initial endowments. Indeed that is the case, already
pointed out by Weber (2001), but some formal mathematical work must be carried
out to make a precise statement. We do the job adapting to our setting the definition
of a generalized marginal rate of substitution among commodities given by Besada
and Vázquez (1999). The general idea is simple to grasp. Imagine the consumer loses
part of her initial endowments, c∗, by certain percentages, say ω2 = (ω21, . . . , ω2p),
and therefore decreases her optimal level of utility. Now, the consumer tries to com-
pensate that loss, and maintain her original level of utility u∗ = V (c∗), by increasing
the initial resources by other proportions, say ω1 = (ω11, . . . , ω1p). How many “units”
of ω1 must she buy to do so? That number would be the generalized marginal rate
of substitution between endowment proportions ω1 and ω2 at c∗, G M RSω1,ω2(c∗).
Saying that the proportions in ω1 and ω2 are different is the same as saying that the
vectors are linearly independent.
Consider two unitary linearly independent parameter vectors ω1, ω2 ∈ Rp+. We
claim that if |α| < r2 and |β| < r2 then c∗ + αω1 + βω2 ∈ B(c∗, r). Indeed,
‖c∗ − (c∗ + αω1 + βω2)‖ ≤ |α|‖ω1‖ + |β|‖ω2‖ < r,
Then, we can define function F : (− r2 , r2 ) × (− r2 , r2 ) −→ R, as F(α, β) = V (c∗ +
αω1 + βω2). By the chain rule,
DF(α, β) = DV (c∗ + αω1 + βω2)(ω1, ω2)
= Dω1V (c∗ + αω1 + βω2), Dω2V (c∗ + αω1 + βω2) ,
where Dωi V is the directional derivative of V in the direction of unit vector ωi ,
i = 1, 2.
Now, we study the structure of the set of endowments c near c∗ that assure a level of
utility equal to u∗. Consider the function H : (− r2 , r2 ) × (− r2 , r2 ) −→ R, H(α, β) =
F(α, β) − V (c∗). Trivially, H is a C1 function, H(0, 0) = 0 and
∂ H
∂β
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By virtue of the implicit function theorem, there exists a unique C1-function β = ϕ(α)
such that c∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2 belongs to the u∗-level set of V , i.e. the indirect utility
function remains constant at u∗. Besides, for α small,
ϕ′(α) = − D1F(α, ϕ(α))
D2F(α, ϕ(α))
= − Dω1V (c
∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2)
Dω2V (c∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2)
. (13)
Definition 2 We define the generalized marginal rate of substitution between endow-
ment proportions ω1 and ω2 at the point c∗ as the real number
G M RSω1,ω2(c




Let C = {e1, . . . , ep} be the canonical base of Rp. If we take ω1 = e j and ω2 =
ek, j = k, the GMRS will be named the marginal rate of substitution of c j for ck , and
denoted as M RSj,k(c∗) = G M RSe j ,ek (c∗).
As said before, G M RSω1,ω2(c
∗) represents the change in the endowments in the
proportions given by ω1 that would be necessary to compensate for a loss in initial
resources proportional to ω2, keeping the utility level constant and equal to u∗ =






















1 + · · · + λ∗mω1m
λ∗1ω21 + · · · + λ∗mω2m
.




1 + M RS2,1(c∗)ω12 + · · · + M RSm,1(c∗)ω1m
ω21 + M RS2,1(c∗)ω22 + · · · + M RSm,1(c∗)ω2m
.
Let us summarize our findings in the following result.
Theorem 4 Under assumptions (A1)–(A5), given any linearly independent param-
eter vectors ω1, ω2 ∈ Rp+ such that ||ω1|| = ||ω2|| = 1, there exists a unique C1-
function β = ϕ(α) defined in a neighborhood of (0, 0) such that the indirect utility
function V remains constant at u∗ = V (c∗) along the curve c∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2.
Besides, for all c = c∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2,
6 Obviously, one can derive analogous expressions dividing by λ∗j , j = 1, . . . , m.
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G M RSω1,ω2(c) =
ω11 + ρ12(c)ω12 + · · · + ρ1m(c)ω1m
ω21 + ρ12(c)ω22 + · · · + ρ1m(c)ω2m
, (14)
M RSj,k(c) = ρkj (c). (15)
We end this section by differentiating expression (13), if F is twice continuously





2D11F − 2D1F D2F D12F + (D1F)2D22F
)
. (16)
where all the derivatives must be evaluated at (α, ϕ(α)).
6 Expenditure minimization multipliers as MRS between initial endowments
Letu∗ = V (c∗)be the optimal level of utility the consumer achieves at c∗.Applying the
main theoremofBesada andMirás (2002)weknow that x∗ = x(c∗) is aminimumof all





u − U (x) = 0
g−k(x) = c−k
(E R(u, c−k))
that satisfies the second-order sufficiency conditions for a strict local minimum. The
implicit function theorem guarantees the existence of an open neighborhood B =
B((u∗, c∗−k), s) ⊂ Rm and unique C1-functions xk and λk , such that, for all (u, c−k) ∈
B, xk(u, c−k) is a strict local minimum of the k-th equality constraint reciprocal prob-
lem E R(u, c−k) with strictly negative Lagrange multipliers given by λk(u, c−k). The
k-th expenditure function ek is the minimum value function corresponding to problem
E R(u, c−k), that is, ek(u, c−k) = gk(xk(u, c−k)). Next, we detail some straightfor-
ward properties of the expenditure functions ek .
Proposition 4 Let U and G satisfy (A1) and (A4) and be the bordered Hessian with
nonzero determinant at (x∗, λ∗), the optimal solution for the problem E P(c). For
each k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the expenditure function ek is strictly increasing in u and strictly
decreasing in each coordinate c j , j = k. In fact, for all (u, c−k) ∈ B, ∂ek∂u (u, c−k) =
−μk
(u, c−k) > 0 and ∂e
k
∂c j
(u, c−k) = λkj (u, c−k) < 0 whenever j = k.
Then, higher levels of utility required higher levels of expenditure in the k resource to
achieve, while if one increases the endowment c j the cost incurred in the k resource
will decrease. We are now ready to provide an interpretation for the reciprocal multi-
pliers λkj , j = k, that follows directly from equality (8) and the fundamental reciprocal
relation (15).
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Proposition 5 Under assumptions (A1)–(A5), we have that, for all c = c∗ + αe j +
ϕ(α)ek ,
λkj (c) = −M RSj,k(c) (17)
Consequently, the reciprocal multipliers λkj , j = k, are, up to the sign, the MRS
between initial endowments c j and ck in the indirect utility function, i.e. they mea-
sure the units of endowment c j that would be necessary to compensate for a loss of
one unit of initial endowment ck while keeping the utility level constant and equal to
u∗ = V (c∗).
7 Quasi-concavity and diminishing MRS between endowments
It is a known fact (Silberberg 1990) that the sign of the derivatives of the Lagrangemul-
tipliers λ j (c), themarginal utility of endowment c j in the primal problem, with respect
to the other resources varies with the application of monotone increasing transforma-
tions to the direct utility function U . As a consequence, the concept of diminishing
marginal utility of income (or any other endowment) is meaningless. But according to
Theorem 3 and (17) the multipliers of the reciprocal problems λkj are invariant under
monotonic transformations and, in turn, can be interpreted as marginal rates of sub-
stitution. Thus, we can explore the possibility of having a diminishing marginal rate
of substitution between the initial endowments in the indirect utility function.
On the other hand, in speaking of a quasi-concave function one assumes a spe-
cific convex domain of definition. When talking about utility functions, this domain
is taken to be Rn+. A quasi-concave function f is one that has a diminishing marginal
rate of substitution, if ∇ f > 0. In the previous section, we have established the quasi-
concavity of the indirect utility function V on a certain convex domain D where V is
well defined. In applications we will rarely have D = Rm+ so we must be careful not
to imply at once that V exhibits diminishing marginal rates of substitution.
Theorem 5 If V is quasi-concave on B(c∗, r) then F is quasi-concave on Ir =(− r2 , r2 ) × (− r2 , r2 ), for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Rp+ such that ||ω1|| = ||ω2|| = 1.
Proof Recall that, given two linearly independent ω1, ω2 ∈ Rp+ such that ||ω1|| =
||ω2|| = 1we define F(α, β) = V (c∗+αω1+βω2). Now, take (α, β) ∈ Ir , (α′, β ′) ∈
Ir and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
F(t (α, β) + (1 − t)(α′, β ′)) = F(tα + (1 − t)α′, tβ + (1 − t)β ′)
= V (c∗ + (tα + (1 − t)α′)ω1 + (tβ + (1 − t)β ′)ω2)
= V (t (c∗+αω1+βω2) + (1 − t)(c∗ + α′ω1 + β ′ω2))
≥ min{V (c∗ + αω1 + βω2), V (c∗ + α′ω1 + β ′ω2)}
= min{F(α, β), F(α′, β ′)}
where the inequality holds because V is quasi-concave on B(c∗, r). The expression
obtained characterizes the quasi-concavity of F on Ir . 
unionsq
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We state the following result readily adapted from Theorem 4 in Arrow and En-
thoven (1961).
Theorem 6 If F ∈ C2(Ir ) and F is quasi-concave on Ir then
det
⎛
⎝ 0 D1F(α, β) D2F(α, β)D1F(α, β) D11F(α, β) D12F(α, β)
D2F(α, β) D21F(α, β) D22F(α, β)
⎞
⎠ ≥ 0
for all (α, β) ∈ Ir .










The following result is straightforward.
Corollary 1 Assume V is C2 and ∇V (c) > 0. Under assumptions of Theorem 4, if V
is quasi-concave on B(c∗, r) then given any parameter vectors ω1, ω2 ∈ Rp+ such that
||ω1|| = ||ω2|| = 1 the generalized marginal rate of substitution G M RSω1,ω2(c(α))
decreases7 along the curve c(α) = c∗ + αω1 + ϕ(α)ω2.
In fact, what we know is that ϕ′′(α) = − ddα (G M RSω1,ω2(c(α))) ≥ 0. Remember that
the marginal rate of substitution is M RSj,k(c) = ρkj (c) = −λkj (c) so, alternatively
one can try to compute the derivatives of the reciprocal multipliers λkj and the ratios of
primal multipliers ρkj and analyze their sign to imply monotonicity of MRS. Certainly,
one can obtain expressions for the derivatives
∂λkj
∂ci
by applying the implicit function
theorem to the first order necessary conditions of problem E R(c). Analogously, the
derivatives of ρkj can be computed by applying the implicit function theorem to the
first order necessary conditions of the primal problem and then using the quotient rule
of differentiation. In any case, the expressions are so general that no information on the
sign of these derivatives, and subsequently on the property of diminishing marginal
rates of substitution, can be inferred from the simple hypotheses of our setting.
8 Summarizing example and conclusions
We will summarize our results by means of a very simple example with just two
constraints. An atomistic consumer has complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous,
monotonic, convex and twice continuously differentiable preferences over the con-
sumption set Rn+. Then, they can be represented by a C2 quasi-concave utility function
U : Rn+ → R. The consumer is endowed with a fixed monetary income R > 0 and
7 If ∇V (c) < 0 then the GMRS would be increasing.
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faces the budget constraint px ≤ R, where p ∈ Rn+ is the vector of market prices of
the n goods.
Now, assume that the consumer lives in a time of severe scarcity and that the
authorities restrict consumption by issuing some rationing coupons. The consumer
then faces another constraint, the rationing constraint, g(x) ≤ c, where c > 0 is the
coupon endowment and g is a convex function. The simplest form is given by the
linear constraint g(x) = qx where qi ≥ 0 is the price of good i in ration coupons.








There are 2 associated reciprocal problems. One is that of minimizing rent expendi-





U (x) ≥ u0
g(x) ≤ C
x ≥ 0
The other is the problem of minimizing rationing expenditure while guaranteeing






U (x) ≥ u0
x ≥ 0
In this example, monotonicity is a hypothesis of desirability on the preference rela-
tion, in the sense that all goods are not harmful. This condition is very common and
guarantees that ∇U (x) > 0. In any case, it will suffice that ∂U
∂xi
(x) > 0, for some
relevant variable i . Then (4) holds and, trivially, (5) is also satisfied. Then, any con-
sumption bundle x(R, c) satisfying the (F OC) solves the primal and the 1-reciprocal
problem (if the budget constraint is binding). Moreover, since both constraints in the
primal problem are convex and U is quasi-concave, the indirect utility function V is
quasi-concave in its domain.
Under some technical conditions that assure existence and differentiability of the
indirect utility function V in the neighbourhood of a known solution x∗, and always
taking the wanted level of utility in the reciprocal problems as being equal to the
optimal utility in the primal problem, we can affirm that
1. The marginal utility of income (multiplier λ1) is the reciprocal of the marginal
cost of utility in the 1-reciprocal problem (multiplier μ1).
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2. Multiplier λ12 in the 1-reciprocal problem is the MRS between income R and the
rationing coupon endowment c. Multiplier λ12 coincides with the primal problem
multipliers ratio λ2
λ1
which is invariant by positive monotonic transformations of
utility.
Multiplier λ12 represents the units of monetary income that the consumer is willing to
give up to compensate for a loss of one unit of the coupon endowment while keeping
utility constant.
Finally, since preferences are monotonic, ∇U > 0, and the indirect utility function
V is quasi-concave, theMRS between income R and the rationing coupon endowment
c decreases, that is, as income rises the rate of exchange between income and the other
endowment to hold utility constant decreases. This property does not depend on the
utility representation of the consumer’s preferences chosen.
To conclude, we have developed a framework where the concept of diminishing
marginal utility of income (or any other initial endowment) can be derived from
basic assumptions on the consumer’s preferences. The fundamental property is
quasi-concavity of the direct utility function that, under adequate conditions, implies
quasi-concavity of the indirect utility function. We have also explored the relationship
between the consumer’s utility maximization problem and the associated cost mini-
mization reciprocal problems. Given the extensive use of these kinds of models in the
literature, our results have a potentially wide range of application.
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